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The 11th Presidential Election in Iran
Pilihan Raya Presiden Iran ke-11
abdol MoghSet baNi kaMal & hadi gaMShadzehiFar
ABSTRACT
The political structure of Iran is a theocratic system based on Shia doctrine. The most powerful religious and political 
authority is a Shia religious authority known as the Supreme Leader. However, the head of government is a president 
elected through popular vote. So far eleven presidential elections have been held since the 1979 revolution. The 
eleventh presidential election was held on June 14, 2013. It was one of the most important presidential elections. It 
owed its importance to the previous controversial presidential election in 2009 which led to a wide popular uprising. 
More importantly, the eleventh presidential election was held amid tensions among different political streams within 
the political system. Based on primary and some secondary sources, this paper looks at the Iranian electoral laws, the 
candidates, their campaigns, voting, the election result and the wider significance of the eleventh presidential election. 
It specifically answers the following questions: what was the importance of the eleventh presidential election? What 
were the electoral laws, institutions and procedures for the presidential election in Iran? How was the presidential 
election conducted? What role do presidential elections play in the Iranians’ quest for democracy? This paper finds 
that although the election results received welcome by Iranians, there are significant flaws in the Iranian electoral 
system which casts doubt on the credibility of the elections being held in Iran. In particular, there were series of events 
during the eleventh presidential election which affected its natural outcome. Finally, this paper discovers that despite 
the conservatives’ paean, the presidential election was a major setback for them.
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ABSTRAK
Struktur politik di Iran adalah sistem teokratik yang berlandaskan doktrin Syiah. Kuasa agama dan politik paling 
kuat di Iran ialah daripada pihak berkuasa keagamaan Syiah yang juga dikenali sebagai Pemimpin Agung. Walau 
bagaimanapun, ketua kerajaannya adalah presiden yang dipilih melalui undian paling banyak. Setakat ini sebelas 
pilihan raya telah diadakan sejak revolusi 1979. Pilihan raya kesebelas telah diadakan pada 14 Jun 2013 dan 
merupakan salah satu pilihan raya yang paling penting kerana pilihan raya yang dilaksanakan pada tahun 2009 
membawa kepada pemberontakan. Apa yang lebih penting lagi, pilihan raya kesebelas telah diadakan di tengah-
tengah ketegangan aliran politik yang berbeza dalam sistem politik Iran. Berdasarkan sumber primer dan sekunder, 
makalah ini melihat kepada undang-undang pilihan raya Iran, calon-calon, kempen, undian, keputusan pilihan raya 
dan signifikan daripada pilihan raya tersebut. Secara khususnya makalah ini menjawab persoalan berikut: Apakah 
kepentingan pilihan raya presiden kesebelas? Apakah undang-undang pilihan raya, institusi dan prosidur pilihan 
raya yang dilaksanakan di Iran? Bagaimanakah pilihan raya presiden dijalankan? Apakah peranan yang dimainkan 
oleh pilihan raya presiden dalam usaha Iran untuk demokrasi? Makalah ini mendapati bahawa walaupun keputusan 
pilihan raya mendapat sambutan oleh rakyat Iran, namun terdapat kelemahan ketara yang menimbulkan keraguan 
terhadap sistem dan kredibiliti pilihan raya yang diadakan. Khususnya, terdapat peristiwa semasa pilihan raya 
presiden dijalankan yang menjejaskan keputusan pilihanraya. Akhirnya, makalah ini menemui bahawa disebalik 
kemenangan konsevatif, pilihan raya Presiden adalah satu tamparan kepada mereka.




Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
in 1979, eleven presidential elections have been held in 
the country. The ruling elite tend to interpret people’s 
participation in these elections as a sign of support for 
the Islamic Republic. They also cite these elections as a 
proof for the democratic nature of their Islamic political 
system. Signboards sporting a message of the founder of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, that 
“the vote of the nation is the true measurement”, also 
stands in glory in every nook and corner of the country. 
However, there are a number of legal, institutional, 
and procedural issues related to the election quality in 
Iran, which are always highlighted by the opponents as 
obstacles to democracy in the country. 
This paper analyses Iran’s 11th presidential election 
held on June 14, 2013.  First, it discusses the importance 
of the 11th presidential election. Second, it examines the 
electoral laws and procedures related to the presidential 
elections in Iran. Third, it examines the parties and 
candidates contesting the election. Fourth, it examines 
the campaigns, campaign issues and the voting process. 
Finally, it analyses the election results with particular 
reference to the Iranians’ struggle for democracy. 
DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
Elections are considered as the very spirit of a democracy. 
However, one needs to know more “about the conditions 
existing in particular countries before awarding them 
accolade  ‘democratic’ simply on this basis” (Moten 
2000: 67). To put differently, although democracy cannot 
exist without elections, it’s not the only political system 
where elections are held. In Schedler’s view “Elections 
have been an instrument of authoritarian control as well 
as a means of democratic governance” (2000: 36). He 
argues that the era of overt repression is over, and even 
the authoritarian regimes now operate under the shadow 
of elections. Schedler suggests three types of political 
systems where elections are held:  liberal democracy, 
electoral democracy, and electoral authoritarianism. 
According to him, “while liberal democracies go beyond 
the electoral minimum”, electoral democracies “manage 
to ‘get elections right’ but fail to institutionalize other 
vital dimensions of democratic constitutionalism, such 
as the rule of law, political accountability, bureaucratic 
integrity, and public deliberation” (Schedler 2000: 37). 
And, in electoral authoritarianism, the contests do not 
comply with minimal democratic norms at all (Schedler, 
2000: 38).
Essentially, ‘democracy’ means having the rights 
to choose political leaders through regular, free and 
fair elections (Diamond 2008: 21). In the words of 
Schumpeter, democracy is an “institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions which realizes the 
common good” (Schumpeter 2003: 250). Therefore, 
there is no disagreement on the meaning of ‘democracy’. 
However, academics disagree on the criteria for calling 
a system ‘democracy’ (See. Schumpeter 2003: 250-
254). It is a fact that democracy cannot be achieved in 
the absence of freedom of expression and association, 
and the rule of law. So, while free and fair elections are 
important for institutionalization of democracy, they are 
not enough (Diamond 2008: 21). A democratic system 
besides having free and fair elections must amongst 
others, ensure that all ethnic and religious minorities 
are equally accommodated. More importantly, electoral 
laws should be consistent with related universal laws or 
at least should not be contradictory to those universal 
laws (Diamond 2008: 22).
Failing the above would turn a system into pseudo 
democracy (Diamond 2008: 23). As argued by Diamond 
(2003: 23), “competitive and uncertain elections, even 
frequent alternation of parties in power, can coexist with 
serious issues such as human rights violation, absence 
of social and political freedom, discrimination against 
minorities, etc.” Diamond rightly argues that “Electoral 
democracy helps to make these other values more 
achievable, but it does not by any means ensure them” 
(Diamond 2008: 23).
Against this background, one would need to know 
the electoral laws, institutions and the procedure for 
presidential elections in Iran. It is also imperative to 
examine the importance of the 11th presidential election, 
the way it was conducted, and its role in the Iranian’s 
quest for democracy. 
THE 11TH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND ITS 
IMPORTANCE
The 11th presidential election was one of the most 
important elections in the history of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, as it followed the controversial 2009 presidential 
election that stirred massive protests throughout the 
country and eventually led to the emergence of the 
popular pressure group known as the Green Movement. 
International and local observers showed particular 
interest in the 11th presidential election for two main 
reasons. First, they were interested in the reaction of 
the Green Movement to the 11th presidential election, 
given the severe crackdown on protesters in the 
previous election and the arrest of the movement’s two 
top leaders: Mehdi Karrobi and Mir Hussain Moosavi. 
Second, they wanted to know how the ruling elites 
would move to avoid crisis in these elections in the 
aftermath of the Green Movement.
Later developments also tended to add to the 
importance of the 11th presidential election. The 
most important factor was the relationship between 
Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader. While 
Ahmadinejad enjoyed strong support from the Supreme 
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Leader, and even his second-term controversial victory 
was explicitly backed by the Supreme Leader, their 
relationship became subject to many disputes during 
Ahmadinejad’s second term in office. However, no 
drastic measures were taken against Ahmadinejad due to 
the initial strong support of the Supreme Leader to him, 
as any political crisis could potentially leave a question 
mark on the wisdom and choice of the Supreme Leader. 
As they put it in Persian, ‘Ahmadinejad, in his second 
term, turned into a bone stuck in the Supreme Leader’s 
throat that he could neither swallow nor take out’. 
Perhaps it would be right to argue that Ahmadinejad’s 
first-term victory in 2005 was a surprise for many, 
his second victory in 2009 was subjected to many 
controversies, and his departure was a long-awaited 
event for the ruling elite and observers alike. 
Free and fairness in the 11th election was also an 
important issue, as the previous presidential election 
had turned out to be the most disputed election in the 
history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the past, 
only outside opponents of the Islamic Republic would 
question the credibility of elections in the country, but 
during the 11th presidential election internal political 
forces seemed equally concerned for the first time.  It 
provoked the Supreme Leader to warn against using the 
term ‘free and fair election’ as he believed anyone who 
used the term was speaking the language of the West 
against Iran (Supreme Leader 2013a: 1&3).   
The clandestine role of the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard has always been seen with suspicion in elections 
in Iran. Its role in the 2009-presidential election stirred 
massive protests and immense controversy. Yet, during 
the 11th presidential election, the representative of the 
Supreme Leader in the Revolutionary Guards went 
a step further arguing that the Revolutionary Guard 
will set criteria for the election. He asserted that “our 
essential duty is the rational and logical engineering of 
the election” (Tihrān e Imrūz 2013: 3).  
Observers also wondered how Ahmadinejad would 
continue his stay in politics. Among the five previous 
presidents, only Khamenei (1981-1989) had managed to 
ascend to the higher position of the Supreme Leadership 
following the death of the founder of the Islamic Republic 
in 1989, while the other presidents were eventually 
disgraced.1 The debate over this issue involved a key 
player namely Isfandyar Rahim Masha’ee  -- the father-
in-law of the president’s son and his chief of staff -- who 
was labelled by the supporters of the Supreme Leader 
as the head of the so-called Deviation Front. There was 
growing concern among the opponents of Ahmadinejad 
that he might promote Masha’ee as his successor in the 
11th presidential election. It eventually led the ruling 
elites to fear that unrest might begin before the election, 
unlike in 2009 when riots followed the presidential 
election.   
ELECTORAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The post-1979 revolution political system of Iran is a 
‘two-tiered sovereignty’. It claims popular legitimacy 
on the basis of regular elections being held, and at 
the same time the major portion of power is reserved 
for the clergy (Saikal 2009: 92). The Supreme Leader 
is the most powerful political and religious authority 
under the Article 57 of the constitution. All republican 
institutions are controlled, directly or indirectly by the 
Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader is also the chief 
commander of all military and paramilitary forces. In 
addition to the above constitutional prerogatives, in 
the Iranian political system the major portion of power 
are vested among the informal individuals, institutions 
and networks. In other words, the political system of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran is much more than what 
is mentioned in the country’s constitution. These 
institutions, individuals and networks are directly or 
indirectly linked with the Supreme Leader, thus are 
not answerable to any republican authority (Mehran & 
Houchang 2004: 508-510).
The president in Iran, more or less, is the head of 
the state. He is elected through a direct vote for four 
years, and can be re-elected for only one consequent 
term. He chooses cabinet members, endorses the 
credential of ambassadors stationed in the country, and 
signs treaties with foreign countries. He also ratifies 
all laws approved by parliament. Yet, as noted above, 
unlike other republican political systems, the president 
in Iran is not the first person in the country. According to 
Article 113 of the constitution, he is the second in rank 
after the Supreme Leader, and is in fact accountable to 
the latter in tandem with Article 122.  
Based on the Article 115 of the constitution, the 
president should be elected from political and religious 
rijāl. The term rijāl is the plural form of the Arabic 
word rajul, which literarily means ‘Man’. The use of 
the word has led to a continual debate whether or not a 
woman can contest the election. Some law experts argue 
that the term should not be taken in terms of its literary 
meaning, and it is rather applicable to both genders. 
However, no interpretation of the word has been offered 
by the Guardian Council (GC) so far, nor a single 
woman could ever qualify to contest election. The GC 
is the sole authority to interpret the constitution and to 
decide the qualification of candidates in parliamentary 
and presidential elections. It is a supervisory body 
comprising six senior clerics and six law specialists. 
The clerics are to be appointed directly by the Supreme 
Leader in tandem with Article 91 of the constitution, 
and the law specialists are to be nominated by the Chief 
of Judiciary who is a direct appointee of the Supreme 
Leader. 
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At the threshold of the 11th presidential election, the 
Iranian parliament drafted an electoral reform act which 
some of its clauses stirred a controversy.  The most 
controversial clause was the age requirement. According 
to the draft act, the candidacy age is limited between 
40 to 75 years (Fatimih 2012). To many observers, the 
clause was purposefully inserted in the act to deprive 
ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsenjani from contesting 
the election. However, the certification and age related 
clauses were later rejected by the GC, and the act was 
approved partially. Yet, the overall act, brought a major 
change in organizing presidential elections in Iran. The 
most important change was related to Article 31 of the 
electoral by-laws. Previously, the Interior Ministry had 
been responsible to conduct the election. According to 
the new law, the ministry had to work under a council 
namely Hay’at e Ejrā’yī e Markazī (Central Executive 
Board). The board would have 11 members, including 
Interior Minister, Intelligence Minister, Prosecutor 
General, and one member from the presiding board of 
parliament. The seven non-official members would be 
chosen from a list of 30 religious, political, cultural and 
social personalities proposed by the Interior Ministry  
(Iranian Student News Agency 2012). 
However, the profiles of the seven non-official 
members in the 11th presidential election suggest that 
they were more or less officials or semi-officials close 
to the political system, particularly the Supreme Leader. 
For instance, one of these members was Muhammad 
Muhmmadian, the representative of the Supreme Leader 
in universities; another member, Reza Taqawi, was 
the head of Governing Council of Friday Imams; and 
Muhammad Hassan Rahimian was the representative 
of the Supreme Leader in Bunyād e Shahīd (Martyr 
Foundation). To some analysts, the act aimed at 
reducing President Ahmadinejad’s government control 
over the election process. This argument seemed valid 
given the government’s resistance to form the Central 
Executive Board. According to the law, the government 
is supposed to form the board at least four months before 
the election, but it was formed only two months ahead 
of the 11th presidential election. To many ruling elites, it 
was a deliberate delay by the president. 
THE NOMINATION AND THE PARTIES
As announced, nominations were held from May 7-11, 
2013. In the presidential election, major candidates 
usually file their applications on the closing day. 
Similarly, in the 11th presidential election, the nomination 
process started with little-known candidates filing their 
papers. In fact, most of them did not seriously intend to 
contest the election. For instance, one of these candidates 
was quoted as saying, “If Ahmadinejad could become 
the president, why can’t I?” Another claimed, “I am a 
sorcerer, and, by writing a few words, can hoodwink 
the U.S. President Barak Obama. I will write a talisman 
and put it in dames throughout the country, so that 
people would get relief from depression once they use 
the water. I am also able to write something which will 
help provide jobs to the youth and find dream-mates for 
boys and girls.” (Shargh 2013a: 2) Among them, there 
was one old man wrapped in winding-sheet, bearing the 
Iranian flag on his shoulder. Holding a flower in one 
hand and the Holy Quran in the other, he claimed he 
was the only person who could rescue Iran. There were 
also some candidates who believed that nominating 
themselves for such a high position would enhance their 
self-confidence (Shargh 2013a: 2).
The most interesting moment of the nomination 
process was when two important candidates arrived 
to file their papers, just minutes before the nomination 
period was about to end. The first one was Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsenjani. He was at the heart of election debates. He is 
known as the architect of ‘supreme leadership’ (vilāyat e 
faqīh) in its current form, as it is believed it was him who 
paved the ground for Ayatollah Khamenei to become the 
Supreme Leader. After the demise of the founder of the 
Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, in 1985, at the 
Assembly of Expert meeting which had been called to 
choose the Khomeini’s successor, Hashemi claimed that 
Khomeini in his final moments had expressed his desire 
for Khamenei as next Supreme Leader (Takeyh 2009: 
254). However, once considered the closest person to 
the Supreme Leader, he was disgraced by the ruling 
elites following his stand on the post-2009 election 
crisis in his Tehran Friday prayers speech on July 17, 
2009. He was never invited again for the speech. 
However, disqualifying Rafsenjani was not easy 
for the GC. The question was how a two-term president, 
one-term speaker of the parliament, Head of Assembly 
of Expert for eight years, and the current head of the 
Expediency Council, could be disqualified. Therefore, 
the ruling elites preferred that Rafsenjani himself 
decides not to apply for candidacy.  On the other 
hand, reformist leaders, including the former president 
Muhammad Khatami, pursued Rafsenjani to file his 
nomination papers. According to reports, there were a 
number of meetings between Khatami and Rafsenjani, 
each one trying to convince the other to participate in the 
election. Nonetheless, Khatami kept on saying publicly 
that given the socio-politico-economic situation of the 
country, Rafsenjani was the best option.  It’s worth 
mentioning that Rafsenjani is not a reformist in essence; 
he is rather regarded as ‘man of all seasons’. Reformist 
leaders believed that in a situation when everything 
was being controlled, Rafsenjani was the only person 
who could face those challenges. However, failing 
to stop Rafsenjani from application for candidacy, 
initiatives were taken to prepare the public opinion 
about his disqualification by the GC. In this regard the 
first statement came from GC’s spokesperson, who said 
that “if someone is only able to work a few hours a day, 
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his qualification would not be approved in any case” 
(Kayhān 2013: 1&2).    
The other candidate who arrived at the last 
minute was Isfandyar Rahim Masha’ee. He was being 
accompanied by President Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad’s 
act provoked severe criticism from the ruling elites, 
who called the act as a clear violation of the presidential 
oath. The GC called a meeting in which the members 
unanimously declared the president’s act as a crime, 
and the case was referred to the court (Jumhūrī e Islāmī 
2013a: 2).
A total of 686 persons applied for candidacy. As 
noted earlier, the majority of these applicants were little-
known individuals who did not actually intend to fight 
the election. Out of the total number, there were around 
40 major applicants. They belonged to four major 
streams: Usūlgarāyān e Tundru (Hard-line principled), 
Usūlgarāyān e Muctadil (Moderate Principled), Iṣlāṣ 
Talab (Reformist), and independents. 
Within the Hard-Line Principled camp, there were 
four different groups, the most important being Jibhih e 
Pāyidārī (Resistance Front). It was led by a conservative 
cleric namely Mesbah Yazdi, who nominated Fazel 
Lankarani, the former Health Minister in Ahmadinejad’s 
first cabinet. Pāyidārī was formed in the early 2012 by 
a group of Ahmadinejad’s former team members, which 
is why the group is also known as ‘Dismissed by the 
government’.   The other group in this camp was 1+2 
Coalition comprising three persons (Ali Akbar Velayati, 
Muhammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Ghulam Ali Haddad 
Aadel). They had agreed to file nomination but at the 
end, depending on the taste of the political environment, 
two of them would withdraw their applications. The 
third group was 2+3 Coalition, which comprised five 
individuals namely Yahya Aal Ishaq, Muhammad 
Reza Bahonar, Hassan Abu Abu Turabi, Mustafa Pour 
Muhammadi and Manoochehr Muttaki. This group, 
in fact, was a mere coalition of five individuals, while 
the 1+2 Coalition had systemic support from the 
conservative class and the establishment. The fourth 
group was associated with President Ahmadinejad, with 
Isfandyar Rahim Masha’ee as its main candidate. 
The reformist camp was led by the former president 
Muhammd Khatami with Muhammad Reza Aref (First 
Vice-President from 2001 to 2005) as its principal 
candidate. The Moderate Principled camp was led by 
Rafsenjani, with Hassan Rouhani in the second position. 
Finally, there were independent candidates. Most of 
them, in terms of political inclination, belonged to 
the Hard-line Principled camp, unofficially backed by 
different conservative groups and personalities. In this 
category, Muhsen Rezaee, the former commander of 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and Saeed Jalili, Iran’s 
chief interlocutor in the nuclear negotiations with the 
P5+1, were important applicants 
The Ultra-Principled camp had a clear advantage 
over the reformists in the election process. Having 
access to the corridors of power, the Ultra-Principled 
camp mostly resorted to pressure tactics and force 
while the reformist, due to their weak position in the 
power structure, adopted a softer line. Similarly, while 
the Ultra-Principled camp had access to state-supported 
media, the reformist camp relied on a few newspapers 
and some websites and online forums. Additionally, 
due to the weaker position of the Ultra-Principled camp 
among the public, they preferred contesting with the 
second-ranking reformists or semi-reformist rather than 
with Khatami and Rafsenjani.
THE VETTING PROCESS AND THE FINAL 
CONTESTERS
With the closure of the five-day-long nomination period 
on May 11, 2013, the election entered its most breath-
taking phase. Around 75 million Iranians were waiting 
for the opinion of 12 individuals (six clerics and six 
lawyers) at the Guardian Council which was about to 
decide who could run for the election. According to the 
law, the GC is supposed to finalize the list of qualified 
candidates in five to ten days after the nomination period 
ends. However, in the 11th election, the GC took more 
time, seemingly because of a lack of consensus over the 
final list of contenders. Eventually, out of 656 applicants, 
only 8 were qualified. The most controversial decision 
was the disqualification of Rafsenjani and Masha’ee 
whose nomination had created a huge hue and cry in the 
Ultra-Principled camp. 
The implication of Rafsenjani’s disqualification 
was enormous. For many it was unbelievable while 
many equated it with putting a ‘cancel stamp’ on the 
identity card of the Islamic republic. The New York 
Times quoted an Iranian youth as saying “they say a 
revolution eats its children, but in the case of Rafsenjani, 
the revolution has eaten its father” (Erdbrink 2013). It 
was believed that by disqualifying Rafsenjani, there 
was no hope left for free and fair elections, and that the 
Supreme Leader would bring his man to the president’s 
office by any means. Rafsenjani was a source of hope 
for many people. To a number of Iranian expatriates 
in Malaysia interviewed by the authors, Rafsenjani 
was the person who had created the Supreme Leader, 
and only he could counter him. To them, Rafsenjani’s 
disqualification had crystallized the authoritarian nature 
of the Supreme Leader.
The disqualification also provoked a strong reaction 
from the political and religious elites. A number of 
high-profile clerics and politicians wrote open letters 
to sympathize with him. Among these letters, some 
were written to the Supreme Leader appealing him to 
intervene by his special order which, in Iran’s political 
jargon, is called hukm e hukūmatī. In this regard, the 
most important letter came from Zahra Mustafavi, 
the daughter of the founder of the Islamic Republic 
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of Iran. Her letter contained an unheard narration 
which marginalized the main theme of the letter. She 
had mentioned that her father, while talking about his 
successor(s), had mentioned Rafsenjani’s name too 
(Mustafavi Zahra 2013: 3).  It was for the first time 
that such a statement was made by a close person to the 
founder of the Islamic Republic challenging the official 
version of the narration according to which the founder 
had only named Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader, 
as his right successor. However, far away of these 
reactions, Rafsenjani himself remained calm.
As far as Masha’ee is concerned, unlike Rafsenjani, 
he seemed determined to defy the GC’s decision. 
The president also supported this stand, saying that 
“Masha’ee has been subjected to oppression. I believe 
in a country where there is vilāyat e faqih, oppression of 
such a level cannot take place” (Shargh 2013b: 2). He 
said he would follow up the case through the Supreme 
Leader until a solution was found (Shargh 2013b: 2). 
Masha’ee’s campaign stalls operated for seven days 
after his disqualification, despite Iran’s chief of police’s 
warning that the disqualified candidates’ campaign stalls 
should immediately be closed, or else they would be 
crushed (Shargh 2013c: 12). Given the temperament of 
the president, most observers expected a bold reaction 
over Masha’ee’s disqualification.   But, as of today, the 
reasons behind Ahmadinejad’s silence towards those 
statements remain unknown. 
However, neither the president’s backchannel 
negotiation for Masha’ee nor the appeals for Rafsenjani’s 
qualification could bring any change to the GC decision. 
Finally, the Supreme Leader put his approval stamp on 
the GC’s decision. In his meeting with parliamentarians, 
he expressed his gratitude to those candidates who were 
disqualified but remained obedient to the law (Supreme 
Leader, 2013b: 3). Consequently, the list of candidates 
remained unchanged with eight candidates: they were 
Ali Akbar Velayati (Advisor to the Supreme Leader 
in International Affairs), Mohsen Rezaee (General 
Secretary of the Expediency Council), Muhammd 
Garazi (a former Revolutionary Guards official), Hassan 
Rouhani (Head of the National Security Council’s 
Strategic Studies Center), Muhammd Bagher Ghalibaf 
(Tehran’s mayor), Haddad Aadi (parliamentarian), 
Saeed Jalili (the  then Iranian chief  nuclear negotiator), 
and Muhammad Reza Arif (Member of the Expediency 
Council, and the Supreme Council of the Cultural 
Revolution). 
Muhammad Reza Arif was the principal candidate 
for the reformists, while Hassan Rouhani emerged 
the candidate of the moderate-principled group after 
Rafsenjani’s disqualification. The three members of 
the 2+1 Coalition (Ghalibaf, Aadel and Velayati) were 
backed by different mainstream principled groups close 
to the Supreme Leader, while Said Jalili was believed to 
be the favourite candidate of the Supreme Leader. Saeed 
Jalili later also won the support of Jibhih e Pāyidārī, and 
its spiritual mentor, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, following 
the withdrawal of the group’s principal candidate, 
Bagher Lankarni. Gharazi was a weak candidate having 
no significant group behind him, while Raza’ee had 
declared himself as an independent candidate from the 
very beginning despite the fact that he had his Jibhih e 
Istādagī (Determined Front) behind him. 
ELECTIONS CAMPAIGNS AND THE VOTING
The election campaigns were scheduled from May 24, 
2013 to the late hours of June 12, 2013. Nevertheless, 
campaigns started before the scheduled time. There 
were three types of campaign. One took place on the 
state-run media. Three rounds of group debate had been 
planned for the candidates. However, the first round 
hardly seemed like a debate. It was like a multiple-
choice test. A moderator would ask them a question and 
the candidates would have to choose the correct answer 
from four available options. Most of the time, the 
candidates preferred to say “the question is incorrect”, 
or would suggest a fifth answer. In the latter days, the 
show turned out into a laughing stock for the public. 
The debates were designed to avoid the problems 
that emerged during the 10th presidential debate in 2009, 
in which the candidates debated on a one-to-one basis. 
The outspoken Ahmadinejad had come along with 
documents related to the misuse of power by his rivals 
displaying them live for the viewers. However, in the 
remaining rounds the candidates were provided with 
the opportunity to defend and clarify their position over 
national issues.  
The second form of campaign happened at public 
places such as public halls and stadiums and universities. 
All eight candidates travelled across different provinces 
to address the public, garnering support for their 
election agenda. Some of these speeches proved to 
be counterproductive. One of Ghalibaf’s speech is 
important in this regard. In a gathering with Basij 
students, in order to prove that he always stood firm 
against the anti-regime elements, he admitted that in 
the position of Commander of Tehran’s police force, he 
had personally sat on a motorbike, a truncheon in hand, 
beating the student protestors at the Tehran University 
Dormitory Complex in 2003. The content of this speech 
offered evidence for his misuse of power against the 
students, thus affecting his vote bank (Kaleme 2013). 
The third type of campaign was conducted through 
posters, brochures, pamphlets, propagation of electoral 
symbols and other publicity literature. The most popular 
symbol, key, belonged to Rouhani. Rouhani interpreted 
his symbol as the ‘key of wisdom’ by which all national 
problems --from nuclear issues to economic sanctions 
-- could be resolved. 
Some candidates and their supporters were 
significantly active on the cyber space, especially on the 
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social media, for their election campaigns. According 
to a survey done by Khabar online, Ghalibaf (with 85 
pages) and Saeed Jalili (with 73 pages) were the most 
active candidates on Facebook. Haddad with 4 pages 
and Gharazi with 7 pages had the lowest presence. 
Arif, Velayati, Rouhani and Rezaee had 15, 26, 44, 
45 pages, respectively (Khabar Online 2013). It is 
interesting to note that Facebook is officially banned in 
Iran, and access to it requires anti-filter software. In the 
meantime, in parallel with these campaigns, negotiations 
were also going on in the Ultra-Principled camp to 
convince them into supporting a single candidate. As 
result, one of the candidates, Haddad Aadel, withdrew. 
The reformist and the moderates were also engaged to 
choose between Rouhani and Arif, as the presence of 
both would definitely split the reformists’ vote bank. 
Finally, Muhammad Reza Arif, withdrew in favour of 
Rouhani, boasting the latter’s position, as he became the 
sole candidate for both the reformists and moderates. 
As scheduled, the voting started at 8 a.m., and its 
period was increased from the scheduled eight hours 
to 13 hours. Ahmadinejad, contrary to the custom of 
early casting of vote by top authorities to encourage the 
public’s participation, came at the last hours to cast his 
vote. Like the president’s 11-day walkout from cabinet 
meeting, this delayed casting of vote was also interpreted 
as a sign of protest to his candidate’s disqualification.  
THE RESULT2
The voting process ended at 11 p.m. after an extension 
of three hours without any untoward event and top 
Iranian officials celebrated a successful election. 
Unlike previous presidential elections, the results were 
relatively delayed. Besides, a gradual update policy was 
adopted. Based on this, the results were announced after 
13 consequent official updates. Although the election 
authorities justified their new method by saying that 
they preferred accuracy over speed, it was generally 
believed that the delayed and periodic announcement 
of the results meant to avoid any unrest that was seen 
during the 2009 election. 
Finally, the interior minister announced the final 
election statistics. Out of 50,483,192 eligible voters, 
35,458,747 voters correctly cast their votes, and the 
turnout stood at 72.71 per cent. As shown in Figure 1, 
Hussan Rouhani with 18,613,329 votes was declared 
as the new president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Ghalibaf with 6,077,292 stood second, followed by Jalili 
(4,168,946 votes), Rezaee (3,884,412 votes), Velayati 
(2,268,753 votes), and Gharazi (446,015 votes). 
FIGURE 1. Number of Votes Gained by Candidates
Source: Jumhūri e Islāmī 2013b: 3.
Votes gained
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Given the fragmentation of the Ultra-Principled 
camp, and the unification of the reformists and 
moderates, most analysts had predicted Rouhani’s 
win. However, Rouhani’s eventual success came as 
a surprise to the same analysts, as they fear massive 
rigging. Interestingly, in the 11th presidential election, 
the Ultra-Principled and the Reformist-Moderate camps 
both claimed victory. Before the election, the supporters 
of the Ultra-Principled not only disowned Rouhani, but 
also attributed him to reformists and seditionists. For 
instance, on June 13, 2013, the representative of the 
Supreme Leader in Kayhān newspaper, in a unity appeal 
to Ultra-Principled candidates, wrote: “Don’t you see 
that the American-Israeli traitors of 2009 sedition are 
screaming in the club of claimants of reformism; and 
their candidate [Hassan Rouhani] even is proud of being 
supported by this bunch of people which worked as 
enemy’s fifth column in the 2009 sedition [unrest after 
2009 election]” (Shariat 2013a: 2).The same columnist, 
in his first editorial after the election on June 17, 2013, 
wrote: “Mr. Rouhani’s emphasis on the obedience to the 
Supreme Leader, his two decades of representation of 
the Supreme Leader in the National Security Council … 
played a major role in his success” (Shariat 2013b: 2).
However, despite Rouhani’s close connections 
to some Ultra-Principled figures, it was clear that 
Rouhani’s victory was not a success for the Ultra-
Principled camp. A micro analysis of the result shows 
that the Ultra-Principled did not perform well even in 
those areas which they considered as their strongholds. 
For instance, Ghalibaf expected a clean sweep in Tehran, 
where he initiated important urban mega-projects as a 
mayor. During the election campaign, he had promoted 
his projects as a symbol of his administrative skill. Yet, 
Hassan Rouhani scooped 1,326,964 votes in Tehran, 
while Ghalibaf stood second with 725,854 votes. 
In addition, the role of smaller ethnic groups 
and religious minorities was quite clear in Rouhani’s 
success. In the province of Sistan and Baluchistan, the 
turnout was 73% out of which 70 % voted to Rouhani. 
Similarly, in the Kurdistan province, 71% of votes were 
cast in Rouhani’s favour. It is worth mentioning here that 
the people of Sistan and Baluchistan and Kurdistan are 
the followers of the Sunnite denomination of Islam and 
they are not allowed to contest the presidential election 
under Article 12 of the constitution; they can only vote. 
Rouhani’s popularity in these areas was a result of his 
promises to address issues concerning religious and 
ethnic minorities after being elected to office. Rouhani 
was the only candidate to highlight minorities issues 
during the election campaign. Also, the support of the 
Khatami and Rafsenjani boasted Rouhani’s position. 
The appeal by conservative clerics for Ultra-Principled 
candidates was not received well among the masses. 
For instance, in Qom, the hub of the clergy, Saeed Jalili 
expected a large vote bank due to Ayatollah Mesbah’s 
open support for him. Yet, Rouhani stood at the top with 
210,677 votes while Jalili bagged only 121,237 votes.
DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS IN IRAN
Many independent observers and analysts are reluctant 
to see elections in Iran as a proof of the existence of a 
democratic political system. They have reservations in 
terms of the quality of elections in Iran, and believe that 
the sole underlying purpose of these elections is to gain 
legitimacy for the ruling elite (See. Amuzegar 2012: 25-
36), and that elections in Iran are a “safety valve, an 
instrument of repressive tolerance” (Milani & Mcfaul 
2008: 31).  The electoral legal framework in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran virtually divides Iranians into two 
broad groups: khudi (the insiders) and ghair-e-khudi 
(the outsiders). Khudis are supposed to be the supporters 
of the Islamic regime while ghair-e-khudis are the non-
conformists. Such a framework systematically prevent 
non-conformists from contesting in the elections (Milani 
& Mcfaul 2008: 27-31). 
However, in spite of being aware of undemocratic 
elements in the Iranian electoral system, the Iranian 
citizens have never paid a significant attention to the 
election-boycott call by the opposition groups. That is 
why, the turnout ratio have never dropped so low to 
become a point of incredibility for elections in Iran, 
though there have always been a strong suspicion about 
the accurate turnout figure. Based on these authors’ 
observations of the previous six presidential elections in 
Iran, there have been a suspicion amongst a significant 
portion of Iranians that the election would be rigged, but 
so far this thought has not stopped them from voting, 
rather it has worked as an incentive for maximum 
participation. 
Although the Iranian establishment always 
translates the participation of the Iranians in the election 
as approval to the theocratic political system in Iran, 
the reality is otherwise. In fact, the Iranian citizens’ 
preference to vote can be explained in the context 
of their quest for democracy. The Iranian voters see 
these elections as an opportunity to disrupt the power 
structure of the theocratic political system of Iran. To 
put it in another way, Iranians see these elections as 
a platform to protest the undemocratic elements of 
the Iranian political system. In the Iranian political 
discourse, participation in elections is a necessary part 
of transition to democracy. According to Akbar Ganji, 
a renowned anti-establishment figure in Iran, “the 
transition to democracy is like a game of chess where 
dictators are sitting on one side and democrats on the 
other. We must enter the game and use all the pieces in 
order to checkmate the opponent” (Ganji 2004: 51). 
Therefore, although in democracies, elections 
are part of the democratic practice and mechanisms 
for peaceful transfer of power, in the Iranian context, 
elections are viewed as ‘marathon of democracy versus 
theocracy’. The general trend in the Iranian presidential 
elections show that the Iranian voters have particularly 
targeted the absolute authority of the supreme Leader, 
Ayatollah Khamenei. That is why, one can easily see 
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that in the Iranian presidential elections, the popular 
grace has been with those candidates who have been 
more distant from the establishment, particularly the 
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. 
 Moreover, the micro analysis of the results of the 
presidential elections in general and the 2013 presidential 
election in particular, shows that the winning candidates 
would scoop the major portion of their votes from ethno-
religious minorities. It is not a surprise that Khatami, and 
Rouhani both received the highest vote from the sunni-
dominated provinces of Baluchistan and Kurdistan. The 
votes of these people should be understood as a sign 
of protest to the current theocratic political system, as 
the sunnis themselves are only allowed to vote in the 
presidential elections, and cannot contest it. Therefore, 
the high voting turn-out in these areas can best be 
understood in the context of ethno-religious minority 
struggle against the undemocratic and discriminatory 
electoral system of Iran. Similarly, in the rest of Iran, 
the winning presidential candidate usually gets his vote 
from the youngsters particularly the female.  Like the 
sunnis and other ethno-religious minorities, the women 
in Iran are also ineligible to contest in the presidential 
elections.
Last but not least, while in the Iranian political 
system, the democratically elected president is a 
subordinate to the undemocratically appointed Supreme 
Leader, the former plays an important role in the 
empowerment of the democratic forces. That is why the 
Iranian youngsters, opposition groups, as well as ethno-
religious minorities have always voted for reformist 
and moderate candidates. They believe that under the 
presidency of a moderate or reformist president, they 
could struggle for their basic rights in a less-politicized 
and social environment. Therefore, supporting Rouhani 
should be conceived as a message by the ethno-religious 
minorities, and the youngsters, particularly females, as 
well as other democratic forces, that even though they 
are discriminated against in the election process, they 
have not given up their struggle for democracy.
CONCLUSION
Although, regular elections are considered important in 
the religious political system of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, the political power drawn from these elections 
is strictly limited given the role of non-republican 
institutions, particularly the Supreme Leader. 
Furthermore, from the very beginning to the end, there 
are clear procedural, electoral and legal shortcomings in 
conducting elections in Iran which significantly affect 
its outcome. In particular, the right to be elected does not 
go in parallel with the right to vote. The electoral laws 
of Iran make the elections in Iran largely exclusive, in 
which a notable group of candidates who don’t believe 
in the theocratic political system or the vilāyat e faqīh 
do not qualify to contest the election. More importantly, 
the Sunnites citizens of Iran who comprise roughly 20 to 
25 percent of the Iranian population are constitutionally 
barred to contest the election under Article 12 of 
the constitution, which requires the candidate to be a 
follower of the Shiite denomination. Similarly, the 
female population of the country is deprived to contest 
the election as it does not meet the criteria of being a 
‘political and religious personality’ (Rajul e Sīyāsī 
Maz’habī). Finally, the analysis of the result shows that 
the ruling elites are facing serious challenges among 
the Iranian masses. Despite serious flaws in the conduct 
of elections in Iran, the Iranian citizens are using these 
elections as a tool to voice out against the theocratic 
political system of Iran. 
NOTES
1. Abul Hassan Bani Sader (1980-1981), the first 
president of the Islamic Republic, fled to France 
amid presidency. Akbar Hashemi Rafsenjani 
(1989-1997) who, in one stage, was known 
as person who had operationalized the idea of 
velayat e faqih (Supreme Leadership), and helped 
the current Supreme Leader, (Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei), to become the absolute religious and 
political authority in the Islamic Republic, was 
disgraced, and his son and daughter were put in jail. 
Muahmmad Khatami (1997-2005), from the very 
first day of his presidency was subject to suspicion 
by the supporters of the Supreme Leader, to the 
extent that after completing his tenure as president, 
his name was put in the country’s Exit Control List.
2. Statistics in this section are extracted from, Shargh, 
2013d: 14 & Jumhūrī e Islāmī 2013b: 3.
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